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FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A PROPOSAL TO SIMPLIFY
THE SYSTEM TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A
COMPLEX SOCIETY
JAMES WILLIAM MOORE* and JERE CHARLES WICKER**
INTRODUCTION
"Of this I am sure: our profession cannot fulfill the promises
implicit in the idea of the rule of the law and equal justice under
law if we content ourselves with being experts and specialists in
great concepts but amateurs in execution."' This was Chief Justice
Burger's concluding statement in his address last May to the American
Law Institute. Earlier the Chief Justice had called attention to Mr.
Early's provocative article urging the establishment of a National
Institute of Justice, 2 had suggested some of the needs and objectives
of a national institute, and had proposed a searching inquiry into the
desirability of such an institute, its nature and purposes. To us the
proposals have great merit. The establishment of a National Institute
of Justice, in addition to the Institute for Court Management, the
Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, the
National College of the State Judiciary, and other agencies, augurs well.
But the problem of strengthening our federal and state judicial
systems to cope effectively with court congestion is an on-going prob-
lem that must be attacked continuously and from all sides. Court
congestion has long been with us-too long; and it will worsen unless
effective means of combating it are deployed. Added to the old grist
of tort, contract, labor and tax claims are the problems generated
by an expanding population and by an increasingly complex society;
0 Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S., Montana State College, 1924; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1933; J.S.D., Yale University, 1935.
00 Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.E.E., Georgia Institute of
Technology, 1965; J.D., University of Houston, 1970; LL.M., Yale University, 1972.
1. Burger, Has The Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119, 126 (1972).
2. Early, National Institute of Justice-A Proposal, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 226 (1972).
Fifty-one years ago Judge Cardozo proposed a ministry of justice. Cardozo, A Ministry of
Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1921); see 7 MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 86.05 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as MooRE].
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claims of the poor and the lower middle income groups that press for
more and better legal assistance; and environmental, consumer and
urban claims-all of which indicate rather clearly that the judicial
systems are confronted with the job of handling a flood of litigation
that is far greater than the courts have witnessed in the past. It will
certainly not do for society to fail those who, in good faith, seek
judicial relief.
With deference, we offer a proposal that federal jurisdictional
principles be simplified. It is, of course, not a panacea for our judicial
ills. Nor is it a substitute in any way for the institutes and centers
that have been established and are being proposed. But we believe
that it does hold out a modicum of assistance, and it can be profitably
added to the arsenal of weapons against court congestion.
The proposal embraces the following propositions: 1) original
jurisdiction should implement the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
2) venue and process should support the functioning of the Rules;
3) jurisdictional amount should be eliminated; 4) removal jurisdic-
tion should be reduced to a minimum; and 5) diversity jurisdiction
should be retained, but simplified.
Before proceeding in detail, let us place the propositions in con-
text. Federal jurisdictional and related principles offer alluring op-
portunities for experts to indulge their expertise. In the interest of
federalism, logic, and rationalization of the federal system, experts
too often propose a scheme that is far too complicated to produce
expeditious and just results. It is necessary to reformulate for present
times the concepts of jurisdiction that have been created by jurists,
lawyers and professors. Lawsuits ought to be tried on the merits and
not be disposed of on jurisdictional grounds except in the rare case.
Simple jurisdictional provisions that can be-to borrow the admoni-
tion of the last sentence of rule 1-"construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" are desperately
needed. Changes of the sort contemplated would require a turnabout
in jurisdictional thinking. Presently,8
[u]nder the most respectable authority adjudications on the merits
go for naught where lack of federal jurisdiction is discovered, often
late in the proceeding, and even at the appellate stage, with the
deficiency sometimes raised by the party that invoked the federal
court's jurisdiction, or by the appellate court on its own motion.
Such doctrines, however, do not increase respect for judicial adminis-
tration, and are not necessary for the preservation of the proper dis-
tribution of judicial power.
3. 1 MOORE 0.60[4] (footnotes omitted).
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As an example of the injustice inflicted upon litigants in the name
of proper jurisdiction, consider Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley.4
The Mottleys had sued the railroad in the federal circuit court for
specific performance of a contract to provide passes. The pivotal issue
was the legal effect upon the contract of the Hepburn Act.5 The
circuit court rendered a decree on the merits for the plaintiffs. On
appeal the Supreme Court, on its own motion, raised the question
whether the trial court had jurisdiction; it held that the lower court
lacked jurisdiction since the federal question did not appear in the
complaint well pleaded. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judg-
ment and remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to
dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then brought
their suit in the state court. After wending its way through the state
system, the suit reached the Supreme Court and was finally decided
on the merits three years after the Court had dismissed the federal
suit. The Mottley case is not atypical.6 If only the experts had been in-
volved, the result would be less deplorable; but litigants, not experts,
suffered.
In McCorkle v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co.,7 Judge
Sobeloff felt reluctantly compelled to apply the Mottley rule. s
After three years of federal litigation, we have the cheerless task
of informing the parties that their contest must be started over in
the arena of the state courts ...
It is a frustration to dismiss a case which so obviously hinges on
federal law and involves federal, rather than state, policies. Especially
is this so since, despite the change of forum, the state court will still
be bound to follow federal law in deciding this case. . . . For all
that appears, federal law is clear in its support of appellees' posi-
tion and the action we are compelled to take is all the more re-
grettable because the equities seem plainly with the appellees.
Whether the doctrine illustrated by Mottley could ever have been
justified is very questionable. It certainly cannot be justified today.
At least, such federal cases should be subject to transfer to a state
court-a partner in our dual judicial system. But we would go further.
As we subsequently point out, we feel that the Supreme Court should
decide such cases on their merits when they are first appealed.
4. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
5. Interstate Commerce Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.). This Act forbids the giving of free passes or free transportation.
6. E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); McCorkle v. First
Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.. 1972).
7. 459 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1972).
8. Id. at 251 (footnotes omitted),
1973)
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When a defect in subject matter jurisdiction demands that a federal
court not retain jurisdiction, a procedure far more economical than
dismissal would be a transfer of the case to the state court so that
institution of a completely new proceeding in that court would not
be necessary. Parties who were properly before the federal court would
not have to be served with process again in the state proceeding, and
there would be no need for repleading. Moreover, all discovery ob-
tained by any party in the federal court would be a part of the
state action. Transfer, instead of dismissal, would also eliminate the
problem created where the statute of limitations has run after the
federal suit has been commenced, but before the plaintiff has had an
opportunity to refile his suit in the state court.
Retention of the requirement of dismissal of cases on jurisdic-
tional grounds is a product of habit, not reason. And habit is largely
to blame for the apprehensions over federal-state tensions allegedly
caused by federal intervention into "state matters." Instead, our en-
ergies and ingenuity should be directed toward making the state and
federal systems into working partners, each with the goal of achieving
justice for the litigants in a manner which best conserves the judicial
time and economy of both systems. No insurmountable constitutional
problem inheres in such a suggestion. There is a strong federal interest
at stake in maintaining a sound and efficient judicial system. Nothing
in the Constitution suggests that a plan providing for a transfer be-
tween the two systems may not be utilized in achieving this goal. As
long as the subject of the transferred case is related to any congres-
sional power enumerated in the Constitution, Congress may determine
the effect of transfer, dismissal or remand of federal proceedings.
But more than that is demanded today. Reaching the merits of
cases like Mottley on initial appeal would not undermine federalism.
While it is true that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
no court in either the federal or state judicial system has unlimited
jurisdiction. The doctrine of harmless error'0 should apply to juris-
dictional matters as it does to procedural matters.
Federal courts have always had a fetish about dismissing cases-
even after full trials on the merits-based on some apparent defect
in subject matter jurisdiction. While it is elementary that federal
courts generally should not try cases improperly before them, es-
pecially if the dispute lies beyond the reach of the Constitution, it
9. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state courts required by art. VI of the
Constitution to enforce federal statutes).
10. See 28 U.S.c. § 2111; FED. R. Civ. P. 61; 7 Moore 61.03-.12.
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should be equally obvious that once a trial has begun, an enormous
amount of labor and expense is wasted if the suit is dismissed.
In American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,". the Supreme Court per-
mitted a defendant who had removed a suit, but had then suffered
an adverse verdict, to object subsequently to jurisdiction on the ground
that the case was not removable. 2 We feel that a party who invokes
the jurisdiction of the federal court should not later be allowed to
contest that jurisdiction. While it is generally true that a party can-
not confer jurisdiction on a federal court,' 3 occasionally a court has
retained jurisdiction apparently on an estoppel theory.' 4 Furthermore,
if an opposing party does not timely object to jurisdiction in his
pleadings, he should be barred from subsequently raising the issue.
And an appellate court should not be permitted to raise the question
of jurisdiction sua sponte; the same rule should apply to the district
court after a trial on the merits has begun. For while federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction, 5 they are also courts of authority. It
has often been stated that their judgments are not subject to collateral
attack on federal jurisdictional grounds;' 6 a similar rule should preclude
direct attacks made for the first time after a trial on the merits has
begun. To the proposed rule we would make but one exception: when
all the parties have colluded to manufacture jurisdiction, the action
should be terminated and transferred to a state court of proper juris-
diction.17
11. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
12. As it turned out, however, the decision resulted in more bark than bite, for
the Court subsequently denied certiorari after the court of appeals had ruled that the
necessity of a new trial was obviated by an amendment dropping a defendant who
destroyed diversity jurisdiction. See Finn v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 207 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).
13. As to a statutory exception to the general rule that parties cannot confer juris-
diction on the federal courts, see § 23 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 46 (b) (1970). This section provides: "Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be
brought or prosecuted only in courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prose-
cuted them if proceedings under this Act had not been instituted, unless by consent
of the defendant .... "
14. See Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960); Klee v.
Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. III; 1 MooRE 0.60[3].
16. E.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928); Cutler v. Huston, 158 U.S. 423,
430 (1895); McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 199 (1825).
17. But when collusion has occurred between the attorneys, their sins should not be
inflicted upon the innocent parties. The court, of course, should be free to discipline
counsel for such conduct.
1973]
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION SHOULD IMPLEMENT THE RULES
In order to gain the proper perspective for assessing our proposal,
one must recall the historical backdrop against which the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were written nearly forty years ago. While
the Rules were still being considered by Congress in 1938, Attorney
General Cummings stated in support of them:'8
But the courts do not exist for the lawyers; they do not exist for
the judges. They exist for litigants, and litigants are entitled to the
best possible procedure that human ingenuity can render. The
courts are established to administer justice, and you cannot have
justice if justice is constantly being thwarted and turned aside or
delayed by a labyrinth of technical entanglements.
As most students of procedure will agree, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have proved to be a great procedural success, largely
because of their dominating principle of simplicity.19 But they do not
operate in a frame of jurisdictional simplicity. Quite the contrary is
true. For example, consider rules 18 and 20, which deal with per-
missive joinder of claims and parties. The procedural problems of
joinder are minimal. The jurisdictional ones are not. Thus, pro-
cedurally, if A sues X he may join as many claims as he has against X-
even if they are wholly unrelated.20 But the joinder will be abortive
unless there is federal jurisdiction over each claim. If the jurisdictional
basis is diversity, there will ordinarily be no problem aside from the
jurisdictional amount requirement, and that will often be minimal
since A can aggregate his claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.2'
But if there is no diversity and A joins two or more claims, while
the joinder is procedurally proper, jurisdiction over one claim on the
basis of a federal question will not afford jurisdiction over the other
unless the second claim is so factually related to the first that it is
within the court's pendent jurisdiction. 2
18. As quoted by Judge Frank, dissenting in Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 953
n.13 (2d Cir. 1947).
19. As a consequence, the Rules have served as a model for procedural improvements
in most state judicial systems.
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a); 1 MOORE 0.97[l]. Rule 18(a) provides: "A party as-
serting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal,
equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party."
21. See, e.g., Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696, 700 (10th Cir. 1940); Cashmere Valley
Bank v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D. Wash. 1940).
See also 1 MOORE 0.97[l].
22. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (upholding pendent
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's nonfederal claims).
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Joinder of multiple parties, although proper procedurally,", is apt
to raise a complex of jurisdictional problems. Thus, suppose A and
several other passengers were injured in a bus accident and want to
join in a single suit. Procedurally, there is no problem. Jurisdictionally,
there is. Each plaintiff must have some jurisdictional basis to support
his claim. If diversity must be the basis, minimal diversity will not
suffice; under Strawbridge v. Curtiss,24 there must be diversity between
each plaintiff and each defendant. Moreover, the plaintiffs may not
aggregate their claims to make up the jurisdictional amount.2 5
Rather than frustrating the simplicity that is the strength of the
Rules, federal jurisdictional principles should complement it. In broad
terms, a simple jurisdictional statute is needed that will implement
the Federal Rules. Thus, with claims and parties procedurally qualified
for joinder, if there is federal jurisdiction to support one claim, that
should end the jurisdictional problems. There would be no need for
any independent jurisdictional ground to support any of the other
claims of A or his co-plaintiffs, whether the jurisdictional basis be
diversity or some federal question.
The same approach should be taken relative to jurisdiction over
counterclaims. While a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims,2 6 under current practice independent juris-
dictional grounds must be shown to support jurisdiction over per-
missive counterclaims 2 7 except set-offs.2  We propose that rule 13,
with one important change, should be the sole test concerning counter-
claims. As Judge Friendly has suggested,2 9 in handling problems of
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (a), which provides in part:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.
Similar provisions are made in this Rule for defendants.
24. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
25. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916). See 1 MOORE 0.97[3]. Moreover, where two
or more defendants are joined by the same plaintiff, the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement ordinarily turns on whether plaintiff's claims are joint or several, i.e., whether
the claims are "separate and distinct." If liability is joint, the claims may be aggregated.
E.g., Siegerist v. Blaw-Knox Co., 414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969). But if liability is several,
usually the claims against each defendant must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. See,
e.g., Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1961); 1 MOOR
0.97[2].
26. See, e.g., Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1938); 3 MOORE 13.15[1].
27. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 391 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1968); 3
MOORE 13.19.
28. See In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944); Chicago
Great W. Ry. v. Peeler, 140 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1944); 3 MOORE 13.19.
29. See United States v. Heyward Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1087 (2d Cir. 1970)
(concurring opinion).
1973]
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jurisdiction over counterclaims, the compulsory-permissive distinction
in rule 13 should be discarded. The potential "snowballing" effect
which would follow permitting additional claims to be pleaded is
more theoretical than actual.3 1
Jurisdictional problems concerning counterclaims are particularly
complex where the United States is the plaintiff. Even where the de-
fendant could have sued the Government originally on the claim, he
may not be able to do so by way of counterclaim unless expressly
authorized by federal statute. 31 The primary concern of the Govern-
ment should be with the efficient, fair administration of justice. Ac-
cordingly, the United States should be subject to counterclaims and
cross-claims in the same manner as any individual. 32
This proposal is not heresy, for we favor permitting counterclaims
against the Government only where sovereign immunity has been
waived as to substantive liability. Nor is it heresy to suggest that rules
18 and 20 should govern the matter of joinder of claims and parties
exclusively, for minimal diversity is constitutional, 33 and concepts of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are so well established that a multi-
tude of claims can be litigated in the federal district courts that have
no independent jurisdictional basis: compulsory counterclaims, ' in-
cluding federal jurisdiction over additional parties; cross-claims; third-
party claims; closely related claims that can be said to be pendent to
other claims over which there is federal jurisdiction; intervening
claims as of right; and suits brought by or against a federal receiver,
at least in the district of his appointment. But most of these concepts
of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction can be applied only with difficulty;
and they do not go as far as the simple approach we advocate.
Justice Jackson once remarked that "[a] vast and utterly unjustifi-
able part of federal litigation concerns only the question of juris-
diction, on which great time and labor and expense are expended
before the merits of a question are ever reached."3' Regrettably, the
remark is still on target today.36
30. Id. at 1088.
31. See United States v. Northside Realty Associates, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga.
1971); see also United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(d); 3
MOORE 13.28.
32. See 3 MOORE 13.29. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (d) now provides: "These rules shall not
be construed to enlarge beyond the limits now fixed by law the right to assert counter-
claims or to claim credits against the United States or an officer or agency thereof."
33. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
34. See p. 7 supra.
35. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 37
(1955). See also Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1 (1968).
36. Admiralty jurisdiction also should be simplified-which in most cases will pro-
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VENUE AND PROCESS SHOULD SUPPORT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE RULES
Venue requirements today are still geared to an age when travel
from New Haven to New York City was more difficult and time con-
suming than travel today between New York City and Los Angeles. 31
And venue problems are compounded when multiple-party litigation
is involved. Venue requirements should be simplified, and the special
venue statutes ought to be repealed, unless it can be convincingly
shown that there is a special need for each provision retained. Venue
in admiralty has always been relatively simple. In the absence of a
pre-empting statute, s8 venue of in personam admiralty suits is proper
in any district where the respondent is found 9 Appropriate principles
of similar simplicity should also govern in other federal cases. Venue
should lie in any district where the defendant can be found or in any
district in the state of his residence. Furthermore, additional necessary
parties brought in under rule 19 or third-party defendants joined
under rule 14 should not be able to object to venue.
In 1938 the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
extended the reach of federal process in states having two or more
districts by providing for state-wide service.40 The 1963 amendments
to the Rules expanded service only slightly by providing for bulge
service in certain situations.4 1 The states, on the other hand, have ex-
ably mean expanding it somewhat. For example, one of the most uncertain jurisdictional
problems in admiralty concerns the determination of whether an agreement is a "mari-
time contract" and thus subject to general admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1970). Common sense and logic would tell us that since the Ship Mortgage Act,
41 Stat. 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 911 (1970), is constitutional, see Detroit Trust
Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934), any ship mortgage would be maritime in
nature. Yet in this case the Supreme Court approved the anachronistic rule that a ship
mortgage (not created under the Act) was not maritime in nature. See McCorkle v. First
Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1972); 7A MOORE 0.285[l].
37. See Moore, Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 35 F.R.D. 305, 310 (1964).
38. E.g., 27 Stat. 446 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 194 (1970) (limitation of vessel owner's
liability); 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 74 Stat. 912 (1960), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970) (suits
in admiralty by or against vessels of United States); 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 782
(1970) (suits in admiralty against United States for damages caused by public vessels); 41
Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (recovery for injury to or death of seaman); 28
U.S.C. § 1395 (d) (1970) (proceedings to enforce fines, penalties, and forfeitures).
39. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. United Fruit Co., 236 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1964); 1
MOORE 0.144[13.-1].
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (f); Moore, Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 35 F.R.D.
305, 310 (1964).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (), which provides in part:
[P]ersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14 [third-party practice],
or as additional parties to a pending action or a counterclaim or cross-claim
therein pursuant to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs
(1)- (6) of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the state but within
the United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the
action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial ....
19731
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tended service substantially by enacting long-arm statutes. Fortunately,
federal service of process has profited from their innovations. 42 Federal
service should be made nation-wide, similar to that which is available
in a railroad reorganization proceeding under section 77(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act,' 3 and in statutory interpleader. 4' At the least, nation-
wide process should be available as to those parties who can now be
served under the bulge service provision of rule 4(f).
Transfer of an action to a more convenient forum should not be
confined, as it is under the current statute, to where "it might have
been brought,"4 5 thus limiting transfer to a proper venue where the
defendant can be served with process.4 6 These restrictions are un-
necessary and impede the efficient administration of justice. The trans-
fer provision is merely a "judicial housekeeping measure"4 7 and should
not become convoluted with problems of jurisdiction. Transfer should
be discretionary, subject to the judge's consideration of the conven-
ience of all parties and witnesses concerned and the interests of justice.
The current transfer provision in section 32(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act4 8 could be generally adopted. If these guidelines are followed,
we perceive no hardship on the parties, regardless of whether a plain-
tiff or defendant makes the motion to transfer.4 9
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (e), which provides in part:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides (I) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an
action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his
property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
43. 76 Stat. 572 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (a) (1970). Subsection (a) provides in part:
"Process of the court shall extend to and be valid when served in any judicial district.
The Supreme Court of the United States shall promulgate rules relating to the service
of process outside of the district in which the proceeding is pending .... "
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970). This section provides that "process and order . . .
shall be addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the respective dis-
tricts where the claimants reside or may be found."
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1970).
46. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
47. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964).
48. 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 55 (1970). Subsection (c) allows the judge to
transfer "to a court ... in any other district, regardless of the location of the principal
assets of the bankrupt, or his principal place of business, or his residence, if the
interests of the parties will be best served by such transfer."
49. Of course, when the plaintiff moves to transfer it will be more difficult for
him to make a convincing showing that transfer is justified, in view of the fact that
he chose to bring suit in the present forum.
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JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
The United States Constitution itself places no limitation on access
to the federal courts based on an amount in controversy. Nevertheless,
beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789,50 and by successive acts,
Congress has required a specified minimum amount in controversy in
certain types of cases as a method of restricting access to the lower
federal courts, and to the appellate docket of the Supreme Court."'
Presently there is no jurisdictional amount requirement as a limita-
tion upon the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, and the mone-
tary limit on the jurisdiction of lower appellate courts has little effect
on the volume of cases brought to those courts.5 2 Primarily, juris-
dictional amount has significance today only at the trial level. Congress
has progressively increased the requisite jurisdictional amount through
the years. Originally set at $500 plus for diversity in 1789, it has risen
to $10,000 plus for diversity and general federal question cases. 58
Two distinguished commentators tell us that the original purpose
of requiring a jurisdictional amount in diversity cases-both original
and removed-was to "prevent defendants from being summoned long
distances to defend small claims." 54 This purpose cannot justify the
jurisdictional amount requirement today, however, since a party faced
with such inconvenience is protected, at least in part, by the transfer
provisions of the Judicial Code.55
Congress itself believed that the increases in the jurisdictional
amount requirement would protect the federal courts from "fritter[ing]
away their time in the trial of petty controversies. ' ' 56 Ostensibly, this
concern did not arise from a fear that the dignity of the federal courts
would somehow be threatened if "petty" controversies were allowed
to be brought, since there are many classes of federal question cases
50. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
51. At one time a $5,000 minimum amount in controversy was required for Supreme
Court review of circuit court civil judgments. The requirement for Supreme Court
review of nonfederal question decisions from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
was at one time $25,000. See 1 MOORE 0.90[l].
52. An appeal from a bankruptcy order of a monetary character involving less than
$500 may be taken only with the permission of a court of appeals, but for sums exceeding
that figure, appeal is of right. Bankruptcy Act § 24, 52 Stat. 854 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 47 (1970).
53. Ten thousand dollars became the required amount in controversy for such cases
in 1958. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958). See I MOORE 0.90[l].
54. H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
39 (1953).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1970) provides: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
56. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
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which may be instituted in federal courts regardless of the amount in
controversy.5 7 Rather, the fear is that without an amount in contro-
versy requirement diversity cases will cause an impossible docket con-
gestion and case overload in every federal district court. But the
jurisdictional amount requirement has not worked satisfactorily to
relieve crowded federal dockets. Chief Justice Warren noted that
while the increase from $3,000 plus to $10,000 plus in 1958 "did result
in a temporary reduction in the filing of private civil cases, the net
effect on the workload has been very slight." s58 Moreover, under vari-
ous theories of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction the requirement
does not apply to impleaded third parties, 59 compulsory counter-
claims,60 cross-claims,"' or intervention as a matter of right.
62
But, it is unlikely that the courts would be deluged with small
claims if there were no minimum amount requirement as to any
claims. Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, for example,
a purchaser could institute a suit in a federal or state court to recover
overcharges. 3 That statute specified no jurisdictional amount, despite
the fact that, because of the nature of the claims, many were mone-
tarily small-even petty. Nonetheless, no evidence ever surfaced which
indicated that petty claims were brought in the federal courts. We
believe that these small claims were not filed in those courts simply
due to the discipline and common sense exercised by the practicing
bar and the practicalities involved in the suit.
Litigation over the amount in controversy has and will continue
to consume the valuable time and energy both of courts and lawyers-
time and energy which could be spent more usefully trying cases on
their merits. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all the
multifaceted complexities which have presented themselves in the
various cases involving the jurisdictional amount issue; but the cases
are legion.6 4 The difficulty is most acute in cases in which the matter
57. E.g., admiralty, maritime, and prize cases; bankruptcy matters and proceedings;
actions involving civil rights; and suits arising under the interstate commerce and
antitrust laws.
58. Warren, Address to the American Law Institute, 25 F.R.D. 213 (1960).
59. See 1 MOORE 0.90[3].
60. See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods., 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir.
1955); 1 MOORE 0.90[3].
61. See, e.g., Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950); 1 MOORE
0.90[3].
62. See, e.g., Knapp v. Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. 111. 1952); 1 MOORE 0.90[3].
63. Ch. 26, § 205 (e), 56 Stat. 34.
64. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913) (alimony); Vance v. W. A.
Vandercook Co. No. 2, 170 U.S. 468 (1898) (liquidated damages); Scott v. Donald, 165
U.S. 58 (1897) (exemplary damages); Smith v. Greenhow, 109 US. 669 (1884) (unliqui-
dated damages).
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in dispute is of such a nature that it does not lend itself well to being
ireduced to a pecuniary standard of value65 and in cases involving
aggregation.66 Snyder v. Harris7 is illustrative of the last matter.
Plaintiff Snyder, a shareholder in a life insurance company, brought
a diversity suit on behalf of herself and all other shareholders similarly
situated against the company's board of directors. Snyder alleged that
the board members had unlawfully paid themselves funds received
from the sale of their stock, which, under state law, should have been
distributed among the shareholders of the company. Snyder's claim
was for only $8,740 in damages, but if all the shareholders' claims
had been aggregated, the amount in controversy would have been
approximately $1,200,000. The Supreme Court, following the old
Pinel68 doctrine, held that the claims could not be aggregated and
affirmed the dismissal of the suit. If the amount sought in recovery
had been due the corporation rather than to the shareholders individu-
ally, the suit would have qualified as a shareholders' derivative action,
and the primary claim of the corporation for $1,200,000 would have
controlled. Yet functionally, for purposes of litigation, the shareholders'
class suit in Snyder is not materially different from the shareholders'
derivative action.
Also in Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn,69 a companion diversity case to
Snyder, the complaint alleged that the Gas Service Company had
illegally billed and collected a city franchise tax from Coburn and
others living outside the city limits. Plaintiff Coburn's claim was for
only $7.81 in overcharges, but on the basis of aggregation of the
claims of the class-some 18,000 other individuals similarly situated-
the amount in controversy far exceeded the jurisdictional minimum.
This was a big suit, not a petty suit for the local justice of the peace.
The district court held that the jurisdictional amount requirement
was satisfied. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court's jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed, applying the
theory of Snyder. If any suit deserves a federal forum, it is a suit like
Snyder or Coburn. But as long as a jurisdictional amount is required
to be met by each plaintiff having a separate and distinct interest,
many litigants who rightfully should have access to a federal court
will be excluded. Why they should be excluded remains an enigma.
One thing, however, seems clear: Snyder has dealt a deathblow to
65. See Kennedy, Valuing Federal Matter in Controversy: An Hohfeldian Analysis
in Symbolic Logic, 35 TENN. L. REV. 423 (1968); 1 MooRE 0.92[5].
66. See p. 7 supra.
67. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
68. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
69. 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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federal consumer actions based on either diversity or general federal
question jurisdiction.7 0
Thus it is obvious that the current rules of aggregation do not
produce practical results. If an amount in controversy requirement
is to be retained, then at least other plaintiffs should be able to join
their claims-regardless of their value-with a plaintiff who has a
claim which exceeds the minimum amount, if these claims arose out
of the same occurrence or transaction. This innovation would imple-
ment procedural joinder and reduce multiple lawsuits on claims
which could be tried conveniently in one proceeding. Actions such
as Snyder, however, in which no individual plaintiff's claim exceeds
$10,000, would still be excluded from the federal courts.
A better solution would be to eliminate entirely any need for
aggregating claims. The amount in controversy requirement should be
completely eliminated as a jurisdictional prerequisite in all federal
cases. The purpose of this simplified and broadened jurisdictional rule
would be to untangle questions of jurisdiction from questions in-
volving the value of a claim and to entitle persons to seek justice in
a federal forum as long as they are willing to pay the costs.
7 1
The district courts could be given a discretionary authority, similar
to that given under the 1958 amendment to the Judicial Code," to
assess costs-including reasonable attorneys' fees-against a plaintiff
who institutes an action in which the amount in controversy, con-
sidered from either party's viewpoint,73 or from the viewpoint of all
persons joined in the action or of a class, could not be fairly said to
exceed $10,000.7 4 Not only would this go far in keeping small claims
out of the district courts, but it would also eliminate the waste in
judicial time and expense resulting from a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction in those instances in which claims for less than $10,000
are filed. A shift from a concept of jurisdiction to one of costs repre-
sents a shift from a troublesome concept that often imperils an adjudi-
cation on the merits to a concept of less serious dimensions.
REMOVAL JURISDICTION SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM
Removal jurisdiction is highly technical and is a prolific breeder
70. See also Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).
71. See Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
TExAs L. REv. 1, 35 (1964).
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1332(b) (1970).
73. The present law supports the plaintiff's viewpoint test. See Saint Paul Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The value of the plaintiff's claim
is at times difficult to determine. See, e.g., Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light,
Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 125 (1915).
74. See note 71 supra.
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of problems that have little or no relation to the merits. An underlying
philosophy of this article is that the federal and state judicial systems
ought to be working partners, and that each system should recognize
the integrity and competence of the other. Accordingly, we would
restrict removal to situations in which a real need for a shift from a
state to a federal court underlies the statute. In the rare situation in
which a suit over which the federal district courts have exclusive juris-
diction is brought in a state court, it should be removable by any
party to the action. And perhaps a case can be made for removal of
certain suits against federal officers75 or members of the armed
forces."6 Retention of title 28, section 1443 of the United States Code,
which provides for removal of certain types of civil rights cases, is of
questionable propriety since the section has been so narrowly con-
strued that it is available only in rare instances. 77 Moreover, a civil
rights removal statute is probably not needed, since a state suit or
prosecution can be enjoined by bringing an original civil rights action
under title 28, section 1343(3), and section 1983 of title 42.78
Removal under the present law is too broad. Since the state
courts are competent to try diversity and federal question cases which
do not lie exclusively in the federal courts, removal of these cases
should be eliminated. Speaking broadly, it is only where some par-
ticular federal interest needs protection-such, perhaps, as suits against
a federal officer for acts committed under federal authority-that the
opportunity to remove should be authorized.
On the other hand, we would grant to state courts the discretion
to transfer a case to a federal court under appropriate circumstances,
such as where the suit is within the federal court's concurrent juris-
diction and the federal forum is more convenient.1 9 The transfer
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a) (1) (1970), which allows removal of any action against
"[a]ny officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him,
for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority
claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals
or the collection of the revenue."
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (1970), which allows removal of "[a] civil or criminal
prosecution . . . against a member of the armed forces of the United States on account
of an act done under color of his office or status, or in respect to which he claims any
right, title, or authority under a law of the United States respecting the armed forces
thereof, or under the law of war .... "
77. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
78. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (section 1983 is an express exception
to the federal anti-injunction statute). But note that this does not affect the require-
ments of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). It should also be mentioned that § 1983
is much broader than the civil rights removal statute. See Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (section 1983 applies to violation of constitutional property
rights, as well as all personal liberties).
79. The line of cases which laid to rest doubts as to the constitutionality of removal
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provisions of section 32(c) of the Bankruptcy Act8 0 could serve as a
model. Conversely, similar circumstances may exist which would war-
rant transfer from a federal court to a state court.8'
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION SHOULD BE RETAINED AND SIMPLIFIED
The debate over diversity jurisdiction8 ' is as old as the nation
itself.8 3 And the debate goes on.84 Few persons, however, have advo-
cated the complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction. 5 While other
theories have been advanced to support federal diversity jurisdiction, 6
can be extended to cases transferred from state to federal courts. See Tennessee v. Davis,
100 U.S. 257 (1880) (removal of a criminal prosecution against a United States officer
on the basis of a federal question defense); Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872) (removal of a civil cause on the basis of diversity). Here,
Congress would merely be granting a limited exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
court, where it could have granted initial original exclusive jurisdiction. See 1 MooRE
J 0.6[3].
80. See note 48 supra.
81. For a detailed discussion of a proposed provision for transfer of cases from federal
to state courts, see pp. 2-5 supra.
82. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, contains the affirmative constitutional grant of federal
court authority over diversity suits, and the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, which
created the federal judicial system, executed that grant. The federal courts have exercised
diversity jurisdiction ever since. For a detailed discussion of the history of diversity juris-
diction, see Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
TExAs L. REv. 1 (1964).
83. While there were attacks made on diversity in the state ratifying conventions, in
the first Congress, and in the press, they were not as intense as the criticism leveled
at other parts of the Constitution. See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial
System, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1948); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAs L. RaV. 1, 4 (1964).
84. See, e.g., Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19
A.B.A.J. 499 (1933); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36
U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1968); Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17
S.C.L. REv. 677 (1965); Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between
Citizens of Different States Be Preserved?, 18 A.B.A.J. 499 (1932); Kurland, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J.
187 (1957); Phillips & Christenson, The Historical and Legal Background of the Di-
versity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959 (1960); Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature
and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317 (1967).
Proposed statutes include, e.g., S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (would drastically
curtail diversity); S. 939, H.R. 11508, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) (would abolish diversity);
H.R. 2516, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (would eliminate corporations from diversity
jurisdiction altogether).
85. Justice Frankfurter was perhaps the greatest advocate of an all federal question
docket in federal courts. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 56
(1954). But there are others. E.g., Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law
Institute, 36 U. CH. L. Rav. 1 (1968); Kurland, The Distribution of Judicial Power
Between National and State Courts, 42 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 159 (1959).
86. Alexander Hamilton believed that diversity jurisdiction was necessary to
preserve the equal right to privileges and immunities for United States citizens. THE FED-
R.AsIsr No. 80, at 440-41 (Colonial ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton); see Moore & Weckstein,
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originally one of its main purposes was to give out-of-state litigants
an opportunity to avoid any possible prejudice-actual or imagined-
in a state court. 7 While it would be difficult to determine whether
local bias against out-of-staters actually results in significantly unfair
treatment in state courts today,88 our instincts tell us that some local
bias exists at varying times and places.8 9 But the inquiry whether the
original purpose of diversity was to protect noncitizens from the possi-
bility of local bias and, if so, whether conditions of local bias and
prejudice still exist, is misplaced. If this were the only justification for
retaining diversity jurisdiction, our attitude would be to favor its
abolition. 90
Irrespective of what beliefs caused the founding fathers to include
diversity jurisdiction in the constitutional grant, the basic question
today is whether it continues to serve a useful purpose. If it does, it
should be retained-indeed expanded if warranted. As Judge Wright
so aptly remarked: 91
Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 1, 19 (1964). But of
course this theory could not be relied on by corporations. See Western Turf Ass'n v.
Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907). It has been suggested that the draftsmen of the
Constitution realized that the availability of diversity courts would encourage enterprise
and the investment of foreign capital in a state. See Marbury, Why Should We Limit
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A.J. 379, 380 (1960).
87. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Bank of
the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Moore & Weckstein,
Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TExAs L. REV. 1, 15 (1964). At one
time a major argument for abolishing diversity was that litigation in federal courts
was more expensive than in state courts and therefore favored wealthy litigants. But
the validity of this assertion has been seriously questioned, even by members of the
federal judiciary. See Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 215 (1959).
88. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1, 4-5 & n.19 (1968).
89. Identification of the precise reason behind bias against noncitizen defendants-
particularly corporate defendants-would be most difficult. Even if prejudice were
established in a particular instance, there would be no way to determine whether such
prejudice stemmed from a general suspicion of foreigners or prejudice against big,
"fat-cat" business entities-whether local or foreign. See Ball, Revision of Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REv. 356, 361 (1933); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations
and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 1426, 1448-49 (1964).
90. In fact it may be that the local bias premise for diversity jurisdiction has spent
itself. The Judicial Code of 1948 discarded a post-Civil War enactment which authorized
removal by an out-of-state litigant on the basis of apprehended prejudice or local in-
fluence. See Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
TEXAs L. REv. 1, 11 (1964). The Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) states: "These
provisions, born of the bitter sectional feelings engendered by the Civil War and the
Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurisprudence of a nation since united by
three wars against foreign powers. Indeed, the practice of removal for prejudice or local
influence has not been employed much in recent years."
91. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
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The fact that the Fathers included diversity in the Constitution
primarily because they feared non-resident litigants might suffer
prejudice in state courts need not and should not preclude its use
a century and three-quarters later for novel reasons only now per-
ceived; if the Constitution confers the authority, we may exercise it in
furtherance of any decent social purpose.
To reject this notion is to adopt a view counter to the fiber of
American constitutional jurisprudence. The Constitution could not
have remained a viable instrument-in spite of the wisdom and far-
sightedness of its draftsmen-without the willingness of the federal
legislature and judiciary to read and apply its provisions in light of
contemporary problems and needs. Indeed, how encrusted our con-
stitutional safeguards would be had the Supreme Court taken a rigid
stance through the years with respect to the Bill of Rights!
We realize, of course, that the mere fact that diversity jurisdiction
is as old as the federal judiciary itself-whereas general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is nearly a century younger 92-is not a sufficient reason
to retain it. But there are reasons for retaining, and even expanding,
diversity jurisdiction. It was this jurisdiction which brought our
nation's courts to the people; and its application was a great cohesive
force in our country. That force has not spent itself.
The best evidence in support of diversity jurisdiction is simply
that "it works." 93 Everyone directly concerned-the litigants and their
lawyers-is generally pleased with that jurisdiction. This is the true
test.9 4 The large number of diversity cases filed is evidence of the
desirability and need to continue and expand the present system. 5
Approximately fifty-eight per cent of all original diversity actions filed
in 1968 were by home-state plaintiffs.96 This fact is rather convincing
evidence that, on the whole, the home-stater does not consider that
his own courts may be biased in his favor. He prefers the federal
courts for other reasons. The reasons are mainly procedural, even
though some features of federal practice that might be appealing to a
litigant may be standard practice in courts of his state. A partial check
WAYNE L. REv. 317, 327 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
92. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
93. 1 MOORE 0.6[1].
94. Criticism of the present system is almost entirely unsupported by data or
stated experience. Most of the criticism is simply based on the desire to lighten the
federal dockets. See Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L.
REV. 677 (1965).
95. See Frank, For Maintaining Diversity jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 13 (1963).
96. ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
467 (1969). These figures are based on statistics gathered by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts.
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list of features of federal courts which account for their popularity-
regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff-includes: simple, non-
technical pleadings; third-party practice; broad discovery; 7 a realistic
attitude toward harmless error; effective pretrial procedures; a possibly
superior jury system as provided by the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968;98 greater confidence of some litigants in the competence
and impartiality of federal judges; greater authority of the federal
judge over the trial; less crowded dockets resulting in a speedier
trial; 99 simpler and less expensive appellate procedures; and a better
staffed and maintained system of courts because of the financial re-
sources back of them.100 In short, justice is served (certainly not im-
paired) by the in-state plaintiff who seeks the diversity court to obtain
a speedier, more fairly administered trial. And the out-of-state de-
fendant has no cause to complain since he benefits from all the same
advantages, and enjoys the added assurance of impartiality thrown
into the bargain.1°1
We do not wish to be understood as demeaning the state courts
by our praise of federal courts. The brightest hours in our judicial
history have been those which witnessed the state and federal courts
working harmoniously in deciding both state and federal matters.
For example, in bankruptcy litigation, resolution of an objection that
the claimant has received a voidable preference' 0 or a fraudulent
transfer 03 will often turn on both state and federal law. Jurisdictionally,
97. Of course, many states have followed the federal pattern and have developed
procedural systems just as effective as the federal system.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
99. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 245 n.5
(1971) (statement of John E. Kennedy); Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice
of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962); Note, The Choice Between
State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178 (1965).
100. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 292 (1971)
(statement of Wayne C. Smith, Jr.).
101. It was once feared that defendants would be subjected to oppressive costs,
especially when long journeys to the court were necessary. See Moore & Weckstein,
Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TExAS L. REV. 1, 4 (1964). But
considering the proliferation of federal courts throughout the nation, the limits of
venue, process and personal jurisdiction, and the change of venue provisions in the
Code, this objection lacks merit.
102. See Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 52 Stat. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). By
virtue of § 60(a)(2), 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970), state law de-
termines when a transfer is made.
103. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), 52 Stat. 882 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 10(e)
(1970), under which both state and federal law are made applicable in determining
whether the transfer is fraudulent. See also § 70 (c), 64 Stat. 26 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(c) (1970)-the "strong arm" clause-under which the rights, benefits, and defenses
provided for the trustee in § 70 (c) will depend on both federal and state law.
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the Bankruptcy Act provides for concurrent use of both state and
federal courts in avoiding preferences and fraudulent transfers'" and
utilizes principles of diversity in section 23.105 Whether a plenary suit
would proceed faster in a state or federal court might depend on
docket conditions existing at the particular time. The important thing
is that the litigant has a choice, and it is this choice that best serves
the ends of justice. Thus realistic federalism utilizes both state and
federal courts when concurrent jurisdiction serves a useful purpose,
as in bankruptcy.
A close cooperation between the state and federal judicial sys-
tems is needed in order to administer effectively our state and federal
laws. That the opportunity to sue in federal courts will result in an
"inevitable destruction of the dignity and prestige of state courts and
disruption of federal-state relationships' ' 10 6 is fantasy. Why should the
experts want to curtail diversity jurisdiction when the litigants and
their counsel-and even the state courts 07-want to retain broad di-
versity jurisdiction?
In an address to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, Chief
Justice Richard W. Ervin, Supreme Court of Florida, made the
following remarks: 08
We in Florida, by gradual degrees under your benign encourage-
ment, understand that ours is a dual citizenship and that federal
104. See §§ 60(b), 67(e), 70(e)(3), 52 Stat. 870, 878, 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§
96(b), 107(e), 110(e)(3) (1970).
105. 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1970). Subsection (a) gives federal district
courts jurisdiction over controversies between receivers and trustees and adverse claim-
ants "in the same manner and to the same extent as though such proceedings had not
been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse
claimants." See note 13 supra.
106. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 119 (1971)
(statement of Richard H. Field). See also ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AnD FEDERAL COURTS 47 (1969).
107. E.g., in letters from Chief Justice Alvin C. Strutz, North Dakota Supreme Court,
to Senator Quentin Burdick, Sept. 20, 1971, the sponsor of a bill which would curtail
diversity jurisdiction, S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and from Chief Justice B. K.
Roberts, Florida Supreme Court, to Senator Edward Gurney, Sept. 22, 1971, both jus-
tices unequivocally expressed strong opposition to the proposal to contract federal diversity
jurisdiction. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 267-68
(1971). And Judge J. Skelly Wright, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, remarked: "If any state legislators, judges, lawyers, or litigants have issued
public protests founded on states' rights principles against federal court assumption of
diversity jurisdiction, those protests have not crossed my desk." Wright, The Federal
Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 321 (1967).
108. As quoted in Dyer, State Trial Courts from a Federal Viewpoint, 54 JUDCA~TURE
372, 376 (1971).
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citizenship requires federal judges and state citizenship requires
state judges. Of course, some decisional conflicts result from a
dual judicial system, but by and large, we have a good working
relationship and cooperation between Florida's state judiciary and
the federal judiciary. There is a considerable degree of deference,
understanding and respect for the respective spheres of decision
making between the Florida judiciary and the federal judiciary.
Much of the carping and caviling voiced many years ago by state
leaders in Florida against the federal judiciary is no longer heard.
Perhaps Erie R.R. v. Tompkins °9 is partly responsible for the growing
cooperation between state and federal courts, since it swept away
much of the federal abuse in the area of nonfederal substantive law.
Gone, for example, are the evils of the Black and White Taxicab
case.o10
Both the fact that the Constitution contains an affirmative grant
to create diversity jurisdiction and the fact that the present scheme
works well cast the burden of a strong showing on those who would
constrict this jurisdiction. Diversity cases do possess a federal element.
The federal court is the only tribunal to which all the parties can
claim allegiance, whether the party invoking the federal court's juris-
diction is local or from out-of-state. 111 In this sense, the federal govern-
ment has an interest in administering these disputes, regardless of
the substantive law applied.
Moreover, although specific grants of other types of jurisdiction
were made by Congress to the circuit courts from time to time, such
as grants over patent infringement and suits under the postal laws,
diversity jurisdiction over actions at law and suits in equity accounted
for most of the civil grist for the circuit courts until well toward
the end of the last century. Diversity cases have been and are today
just as much the business of federal courts as are federal question
cases. Consider a small, and realistically speaking, local labor dispute-
a federal question case-versus the large diversity suit. What makes
the latter more "local" than the former?112
109. 304 U.s. 64 (1938).
110. Black and White Taxicab 9: Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (Kentucky corporation re-incorporated in Tennessee to
gain access to federal court to take advantage of the "general" federal law and thereby
avoid an unfavorable decision under Kentucky law); see Frank, For Maintaining Di-
versity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 9-10 (1963). The fear which some once held that
state courts would eventually cease to function has proved to be totally absurd.
111. Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAS
L. REv. 1, 25 (1964).
112. See Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. REv. 677
(1965).
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Finally, the spirit of cooperation which diversity jurisdiction has
nurtured between the state and federal systems has helped to improve
both. It has brought the Federal Rules to the state systems. Further-
more, the federal system, through the Federal Judicial Center and
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, has provided
the opportunities and resources for improvement of our national
judiciary.11s We doubt that these and other national efforts would
be as fully supported by the general bar were it not for the frequency
with which the "state" practitioner appears in federal court. If crowded
federal dockets are the real root of concern-and we think that they
are-unloading federal diversity cases on the state courts is not the
solution.114 Aside from the fact that the state courts do not want to
accommodate these cases, since their own dockets are already over-
burdened,115 it would solve little; in fact, it would probably create
more problems. Statistics indicate generally that the average waiting
time for trial is at least one year and four months longer in state than
in federal courts.116 Given that state of affairs, justice for the litigants
will hardly be improved by a mere shift of cases from the federal
docket to the state docket. In the final analysis it would seem that if
diversity cases belong in the federal courts, any resulting congestion
should be dealt with by the federal courts-not cast onto the states.1 7
The answer to federal court congestion must lie elsewhere.
The sensible solution is not only to retain diversity jurisdiction,
but to simplify it. As a general proposition, the Strawbridge-' rule
of complete diversity seriously hampers joinder in an original action
of multiple parties, since it requires complete diversity between the
plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants on the other,1 9 subject
113. See Hearings on S. 1867 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 245 n.5
(1971) (statement of John E. Kennedy).
114. Indeed, the federal docket congestion may not be as bad as it seems. According
to Senator Burdick, based on the 1970 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREcrOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CovRTs, over eighty-three per cent of all diversity cases filed
are concluded prior to trial. Burdick, Diversity Jurisdiction Under the American Law
Institute Proposals: Its Purpose and Its Effect on State and Federal Courts, 48 N.D.L.
REV. 1, 18 n.49 (1971).
115. See, e.g., note 107 supra.
116. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 265 (1971)
(statement of John P. Frank).
117. See Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?, 44
A.B.A.J. 243, 246 (1958).
118. See p. 7 supra.
119. For the particular woes Strawbridge has inflicted on courts in diversity suits
where corporations are parties, see Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of
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to a proper alignment of the parties to represent their true interests 20
and the fact that the citizenship of formal parties is disregarded . 21
In the interest of simplifying federal jurisdiction and implementing
the Federal Rules, the Strawbridge rule should be replaced by a mini-
mal diversity rule. This can be done constitutionally.1 2 Hence, in a
case involving joinder of multiple parties procedurally proper under
rule 20,12 1 diversity jurisdiction would exist as long as there is diversity
between one plaintiff and one defendant, irrespective of the citizen-
ship of the other parties-plaintiffs or defendants.
Requiring only minimal diversity would also eliminate the need
to resort to strained applications of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction
theories to soften the complete diversity rule. 2 4 It would ordinarily
dispose of the problems of realignment of parties. 25 And with the
simple venue provisions and expanded sweep of process heretofore
suggested,'126 most of the problems of obtaining jurisdiction over per-
sons needed for a just adjudication under rule 19 would be eliminated.
Regarding corporations, the concept of dual citizenship127 should
be abolished. Instead, a corporation should be considered a citizen
of the state where it has its principal place of business. That a business
is incorporated in a particular state has no relevance in itself to proper
concepts of citizenship. By limiting corporate citizenship to the state
where it has its principal place of business, the definition would
comport more with the realities of citizenship of natural persons,
which is geared to domicile. A single-state corporate citizenship would
eliminate the problems concerning the multistate corporation' 28 in-
Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. Rzv. 1426, 1429
(1964).
120. See City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905);
Alexander v. Washington, 274 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1960).
121. See Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903); Nunn v. Feltinton, 294
F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1961).
122. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
123. See pp. 6-7 supra.
124. See 1 MOORE 0.60[8.4]; IA MOORE 0.163[3]; IB MOORE ff 0.504; 3 MOORE
77fj 13.15, .19, .36, 14.25-.27; 3A MOORE 18.07; 3B MooRE 24.18.
125. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 34 (1968). Professor Currie correctly observes that application of the theories
of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction in order to avoid the Strawbridge rule violates
rule 82, which provides that the Rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit"
jurisdiction. Id.
126. See pp. 9-10 supra.
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c) (1970). The corporation is a citizen "of any State by which
it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business ....-
128. See, e.g., Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 347 U.S. 909 (1954), aff'g mem.
206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953) (multistate corporation incorporated in forum state re-
garded as incorporated solely in the forum state for purpose of determining citizenship);
Patch v. Wabash R.R., 207 U.S. 277 (1907) (multistate corporation could not remove
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cluding whether a corporation has been "compelled" to incorporate
as a condition of doing business in a state." 9
Finally, section 1332(c) of title 28, which treats an insurer sued
under a direct action statute as a citizen of the insured's state, should
be repealed. The purpose of the statute is to prevent a local plaintiff
from suing the insurer of a local tort-feasor in the federal courts of
that state, since it is felt that the direct action statute unfairly enables
the local plaintiff to avoid suing in his own state courts. What Con-
gress apparently failed to realize, however, was that in disabling the
in-state plaintiff, the provision treats the foreign insurance company
unfairly.18° Moreover, in such direct action suits, the defendant insurer
is the real party in interest; thus complete diversity exists when
the local tort-feasor is not joined.
OTHER METHODS To ALLEVIATE DOCKET CONGESTION SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED
Much more can be done even under the present system to avoid
waste of judicial energy. For example, greater use could be made of
magistrates. Many federal judges have already found them tremen-
dously helpful in motion practice and in policing discovery.
Extensive use of masters to act in the nature of "vice-judges," and
generally to aid the judge in mundane, fact-finding matters has been
somewhat unsuccessful for two reasons: too much patronage has been
practiced, and the cost of the masters has been imposed on one or both
parties. Improper patronage could be avoided by providing a panel of
masters appointed by the courts of appeals; if a district judge deter-
mined to appoint a master, he would select from the panel. Moreover,
we feel that the cost of masters ought to be borne by the Government
rather than by the litigants.
from court of forum state in which it was incorporated); Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190
U.S. 326 (1903) (state which "forced" corporation to obtain a charter as a condition
for doing business not considered for purposes of determining citizenship); Memphis &
C.R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581 (1882) (incorporation in forum state where opposing
party resided defeated diversity for removal purposes even though party was incorporated
in other states as well, since it was not "forced" to obtain a charter as a condition for
doing business in forum state); Seavey v. Boston & Me. R.R., 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir.
1952) (same holding as Jacobson); Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.
Pa. 1958) (multistate corporation regarded solely as citizen of forum state if principal
place of business located in that state, even though not incorporated in forum state).
129. E.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541 (1912). See generally Moore &
Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court
Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426, 1429 (1964).
130. See Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action
Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 268.
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Federal judges could do much themselves to nudge the flow of
cases through their courts. Pressure should be put on lawyers not to
overdo discovery. Cases should be set down for early trial just as soon
as the issues are determined. Rule 11ls ought to be utilized more
to keep dilatory motion practice to a minimum. Some districts re-
quire that motions be submitted on memoranda as a general proposi-
tion, granting hearings thereon only in unusual cases. Judges should
refuse to grant continuances except when justifiable reasons are clearly
demonstrated. The creation of more judgeships is, of course, not a
final cure. On the other hand, the number of judges should be ample
to handle all the proper judicial business before them with expedi-
tion, but with such leisure time that the judge may bring to the case
at hand the art of judging.132 When judges reach retirement age,
but do not retire, provision should be made for the appointment of
a new judge-not as a replacement, but merely to provide such
additional judicial manpower as there would be if the judge had
retired. The judge should not be reduced to an automaton processing
a daily quota of cases on his docket. But, just as the presence of
diversity cases on the federal dockets has not interfered with the
creativity of federal judges, an increase in the number of judges will
not depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary.13 The size and
power of the federal judiciary has grown substantially since 1789, but
the integrity and competence of that institution have kept abreast of
those changes.
Undoubtedly, other suggestions can be made to improve and
simplify principles of jurisdiction and procedure. Let us turn away
from jurisdictional concepts that would delight Baron Parke, who
loved procedural entanglements of any type. Let us make simplifica-
tion of jurisdiction our goal, and let us keep the federal courts as
working partners with state courts in the diversity area.
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 provides that "[t]he signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him ... that . . . [the pleading] is not interposed for delay." This require-
ment applies to all motions and any other papers provided for by the Rules. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 7 (b) (2).
132. See generally Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J.
1049 (1972).
133. See Moore, Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 35 F.R.D. 305, 307-08 (1964).
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